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Abstract
We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement
auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of
preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure
electronic bidding systems. Auctions that involve some soft elements, such as com-
plex bids consisting of technical and financial proposals, are particularly prone to
corruption. We do not believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption altogether
in such situations, but we discuss means to make it less likely.
This is a preliminary version of a contribution to:
Handbook of Procurement — Theory and Practice for Managers,
Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2006 (forthcoming).
∗We would like to thank Gustavo Piga for his detailed comments and Giancarlo Casartelli for sharing
his insight into modern procurement. Financial support was received by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (DFG), SFB Transregio 15, “Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems”.
1 introduction
Auctions are an efficient mechanism to procure. This is why they have been used for
centuries, and are used ever more frequently. But they are not immune to manipula-
tions through collusion and corruption. Collusion means that bidders coordinate their
actions with the intention to increase the price. Corruption means that the person who
runs the auction, the auctioneer, twists the auction rules in favor of some bidder(s) in
exchange for bribes. Corruption and collusion are sometimes interlinked. However, in
this contribution, we focus exclusively on corruption.
We describe with the term corruption all kinds of behavior where a person who is in a po-
sition of trust misuses this position to her own advantage. In its procurement guidelines,
The World Bank defines a “corrupt practice” as “…the offering, giving, receiving , or solic-
iting, directly or indirectly, of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official
in the procurement process or in contract execution”.1 In the specific circumstances of
an auction, the person of trust is the auctioneer, who behaves on behalf of the procurer,
and the bidders who have pledged to play by the rules. Obviously, if the procurer and
the auctioneer are one and the same person, there is no room for corruption. However, if
the procurer is a firm with a broad ownership (a publicly traded company, for instance),
there is necessarily an agent who takes on the role of the auctioneer on behalf of the
procurer. The same is true if the procurer is a public organization, such as a nation state.
It is immaterial if the auctioneer is an external outside expert or a public servant. In both
cases, the auctioneer and the procurer are not identical, and corruption is potentially an
issue.
Corruption is a widespread problem in procurement all over the world. Recently, the
World Bank estimated the volume of bribes exchanging hands for public sector procure-
ment alone to roughly US$200 billion per year.2 Therefore, procurers must be alerted to
the different forms of corruption, and one must design mechanism that eliminate corrup-
tion or at least make it more difficult. Different forms of corruption have been observed
in procurement:
• bid rigging,
• bid orchestration, and
• distortion of quality ranking.
In each of these kinds of corruption, the auctioneer may or may not have an existing
relation with one or several favored bidders or the auctioneer establishes a corrupt rela-
tionship only with that bidder who offers the highest bribe. In the following we explain
the major types of corruption and sketch means to restrain them.
1See The World Bank (2004a).
2See Kaufmann (2005).
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2 bid rigging
Bid rigging happens whenever the auctioneer allows a favored bidder to adjust his bid
after receiving information about rival bids.
2.1 Favored bidder selection independent of the bids
Suppose the auctioneer has established a relationship with one of the bidders already
before the auction. The auctioneer allows this preferred bidder to match the bid of the
lowest competing bidder.
This can mean one of two things:
• In the event in which the preferred bidder submitted the lowest bid, the auctioneer
allows him to raise his bid and still win the auction, thereby increasing his payoff.
• If the preferred bidder did not submit the lowest bid, the auctioneer will allow him
to match the lowest bid so as to win the auction anyway.
In all cases, the paid price is the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidders. The preferred
bidder wins whenever he has incentive to adjust his bid, which occurs if and only if the
lowest bid of the non-preferred bidder exceeds his own cost.
Evidently, the original bid of the preferred bidder is irrelevant, because it can be adjusted
in either direction. Therefore, the auction with a preferred bidder is equivalent to a
sequential auction in which the non-preferred bidders first submit their bids and then
the preferred bidder can respond and has the right to match the lowest rival bid. In other
words, the preferred bidder is granted a right-of-first-refusal.
Generally, if this kind of corruption occurs, the auction does not always select the least-
cost bidder as winner, hence it is generally inefficient. Moreover, it tends to reduce the
payoff of the procurer. 3
This type of corruption can be remedied by running an open auction4 or a sealed-bid
second-price (Vickrey) auction.5 Indeed, in the Vickrey auction everyone submits a bid
equal to his true cost; similarly, in the English auction everyone stays active until the
3This follows from two facts: 1) bidders quote a price above their cost, because otherwise they cannot
benefit from winning; 2) suppose the favored bidder’s cost is higher than the lowest cost of all bidders
but lower than the price quoted by the least cost bidder; then, the favored matches the lowest bid and
wins. This shows that the auction result can be inefficient. See Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004),
Bikhchandani, Lippman, and Ryan (2005).
4This could be an open descending-bid English or an ascending-bid Dutch auction.
5The Vickrey format is, however, not popular because it is vulnerable to other manipulations. For
example, the auctioneer has an incentive to invite a shill bidder to close the gap between the two lowest
bids, and bidders may engage in self-enforcing collusion.
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price reaches his cost. Therefore, the preferred bidder is treated just like all the other
bidders and the outcome is the same as without corruption.
The corruption issue is slightly different if the selection of the favored bidder is based on
bribe competition. Suppose the auctioneer asks bidders to simultaneously offer bribes
and submit bids, with the understanding that he will collect the highest bribe in exchange
for granting the preferred bidder status.
If the auction is first-price, in equilibrium, bidders submit maximum bids, and at the same
time submit bribes that are such that their payoffs are the same as in a regular first-price
auction without corruption. The outcome is efficient in the sense that the lowest cost
bidder is awarded the contract, but the entire surplus is pocketed by the auctioneer.
From the procurer’s point of view this situation is most unsatisfactory.
Again, this corruption problem can be remedied by running an open-bid or a sealed-bid
second-price (Vickrey) auction. Because in that case being a preferred bidder has no
value, as above, and therefore, it is an equilibrium to offer no bribe and make a bid equal
to one’s cost.
Practical Conclusion 1. Favor a sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey) or an open-bid auc-
tion if you suspect that the auctioneer has established a favored bidder relationship
before the auction or invites bribes during the auction.
2.2 Favored bidder selection based on bids
In the cases we have studied so far, the selection of the favored bidder does not use infor-
mation revealed to the auctioneer from observed bidding behavior. Yet, it may be more
advantageous for the corrupt auctioneer to delay that selection until he has observed the
bids, for the following reasons:
• The auctioneer may infer the maximum gain from corruption from observed bids,
and then select the most profitable bidder as favored bidder.
• By approaching only one or a few bidders, the auctioneer minimizes the number of
illegal contacts and thus the risk of detection.
As before, in a first-price auction a corrupt deal can take one of two forms.6 The auction-
eer can invite the lowest bidder to raise his bid to the second highest bid, in exchange
for a bribe. Alternatively, the auctioneer can invite the second highest bidder to lower
his bid to the lowest submitted bid (that is, the auctioneer grants this bidder the right of
first refusal), again in exchange for a bribe. Because the auctioneer has good information
about the willingness to pay of the bidders (by inferring their true costs from the submit-
ted bids), he can choose that form of corruption that gives rise to the highest possible
6This case has been analyzed by Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005).
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bribery income. This form of corruption is very hard to detect — and thus involves little
risk for the corrupt coalition — because only two parties have hard evidence on it.
In a second-price auction, a corrupt coalition consisting of only one bidder and the auc-
tioneer cannot change the price paid to the seller, and thus have no possible gain from
corruption to share among themselves. The minimum size of the corrupt coalition in-
volves the auctioneer and the two lowest bidders. They can agree that the second lowest
bidder withdraws his bid, so that the lowest bidder wins the auction but has to pay only
the third lowest bid to the seller. We therefore conclude that the Vickrey auction pro-
posed in the Practical Conclusion 1 is not sufficient to prevent this form of corruption.
Larger coalitions are of course also possible, and they make greater gains from corruption
possible. But the detection risk obviously increases with the number of people who know
about the corruption.
The corruption schemes that follow this pattern rely on the ability of the parties to change
the bids after they have been submitted. If this is not possible, this form of corruption is
no longer feasible. Oneway tomake this impossible is tomake the bidding process public.
As a consequence, the open auction, which is also featured in the Practical Conclusion 1,
suffices as an anti-corruption device simply because it destroys the secrecy required for
this type of corruption.
Practical Conclusion 2. Favor an open auction if you suspect that the auctioneer tries
to make a secret deal with a small number of bidders after the bidding round in an
attempt to collect side payments.
An open auction may not be desirable for other reasons, such as fear of collusion. In
that case one should try to make the sealed-bid auction corruption proof. This requires
technology that makes it impossible to tamper with bids.
One could require that the auctioneer breaks the seals of all bids in public, after the
bidding time window is closed.7 Yet, the bidders have an interest to inform the auctioneer
about their bids, because they also profit from corruption. The auctioneer could therefore
invite each single bidder to come to his office with his unsealed bid. The auctioneer
records the bid, and the bidder then seals it. When all the bids are in, the auctioneer
decides which bidder will be allowed to change his bid, and contacts him. The first bid
of this bidder is simply destroyed, and replaced by the new, rigged bid.8 Therefore, the
conventional practice of sealing bids and requiring the seals to be broken in public is
not sufficient to exclude bid rigging. What is required in addition is that no bid can be
destroyed and replaced.
It is often thought that one can solve the problem of corruption by by employing a safe-
keeper of bids such as a notary public, who is paid a sufficiently high “wage of trust,”9 to
7This is a requirement of procurements funded by The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
8However, such a scheme exposes the corrupt auctioneer to high risk since he has to establish illegal
contact with each bidder.
9The idea of paying a surplus above the competitive wage to those who are put into a position of trust
is succinctly described already in Smith (1776, Book I/8).
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whom all bids are submitted. However, this is not true as long as a bid can be replaced
without leaving trace of it.10
The latter feature can be implemented with an electronic bid submission system. Such
a system must contain a logbook that records who made the submissions at what time
and who viewed them at what time. This requires the use of digital signatures and time
stamps. Because of the logbook, the auctioneer can no longer replace a bid without
leaving a trace. As a result, a bid, once submitted, can no longer be altered.
Practical Conclusion 3. If you suspect the auctioneer to collect bribes in exchange for
favorable treatment of bidders but still want to use a sealed-bid auction format, run the
auction on an electronic submission system with a secure logbook. This remedy also
works if the special relationship exists already before the auction (the case of Practical
Conclusion 1).
2.3 Bid orchestration
Even if bids cannot be changed after having been submitted, corruption may still occur
in the form of bid orchestration. There, the auctioneer serves as a “ring manager” of a
collusive cartel among the bidders who coordinates bids before they are submitted.
A widely publicized example is the recent insurance broker scandal in the U.S. The Attor-
ney General of New York, Eliot Spitzer, sued a leading insurance brokerage firm, alleging
that it “steered unsuspecting clients to insurers with whom it had lucrative payoff agree-
ments, and that the firm solicited rigged bids for insurance contracts.”11
Apparently, the accused insurance brokers collected compensation for steering business
to their insurance company partners, and some even solicited fake bids, which deceived
their customers into thinking that true competition had taken place.
Major insurance companies in the U.S. were named in the complaint as participants in
steering and bid rigging. The immediate victims of the illegal practices were the brokers’
customers.
10An interesting early case of corruption in auctions is Goethe’s dealing with his publisher Vieweg
concerning one of his publications. Eager to know the true value of his manuscript, Goethe designed
a clever scheme. He handed over a sealed note containing his reservation price to his legal Counsel
Böttiger. At the same time he asked Vieweg to make a bid and send it to Böttiger, promising publication
rights if and only if the bid is at or above Goethe’s reserve price, in which case Vieweg would have to pay
Goethe’s reserve price (Moldovanu and Tietzel, 1998). However, Böttiger was not reliable. He opened
Goethe’s envelope, and maliciously informed Vieweg about its content, before he made his bid. Not
surprisingly, Vieweg’s bid was exactly equal to Goethe’s reserve price, and thus Goethe failed to find out
how much his writings are valued by his publisher.
11The Economist, “Just how rotten?”, Oct. 21, 2004.
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3 distortion of quality ranking
In many procurements of goods and services a bid has many dimensions. Apart from
price different quality characteristicsmatter and require judgment. In these cases the typ-
ical procedure is the “Quality-and-Cost-Based Selection” (QCBS). There, bidders are asked
to submit two bids in two separate sealed envelopes: one specifying the price (“finan-
cial proposal”) and the other specifying the product or service to be delivered (“technical
proposal”). The technical proposal is then reviewed by an evaluation committee that
assigns quality scores without knowing the financial proposal. The financial proposals
remain sealed and deposited with a public auditor or independent authority until they
are opened publicly, after all technical proposals have been evaluated, and then price and
quality scores are aggregated using a pre-specified scoring rule. Finally, the bid with the
highest aggregate score is selected.12
A typical scoring rule as it is used in practice is the following: each member of the evalu-
ation committee rates the technical proposals on a score between 0 and 100; the quality
score of the bid is then computed as the arithmetic mean of the individual evaluators’
scores; in a second step, the financial proposals are opened and the quoted prices are
transformed into relative price scores, according to the following formula,
price score = 100 · smallest submitted price
submitted price
.
Thus, the cheapest proposal gets a price score of 100; all other bids get a smaller price
score. Finally, quality and price scores are combined into a total score using a convex
linear combination of the two, for example by giving 80% weight to quality and 20% to
price, as in the following formula:
total score = 80% · quality score+ 20% · price score.
Finally, the proposal with the highest total score is selected.13 The winner is typically
paid the price he requested in his financial proposal; alternatively, the winner may be
paid the highest price he could have quoted while still winning the auction (generalized
Vickrey pricing rule).
In dealing with the corruption problem, first we need to take care of the bid rigging, as
discussed in the previous sections. This is relevant here both with respect to the financial
and the technical proposal. Note that the use of an open auction (Practical Conclusion 2),
12The terms employed here are used in the World Bank Guidelines which offer a good example for a
set of well-thought out procurement rules for goods and services. See The World Bank (2004a,b), and
for similar rules The Asian Development Bank (2002).
13This rule differs considerably from the standardmodel of scoring auctions in the economics literature
(Che, 1993, Asker and Cantillon, 2004). That literature assumes that the procurer computes the total
score of a proposal by estimating the value of the technical proposal and deducting the price quoted in
the financial proposal. In practical applications it is, however, often impossible to compute the economic
value of the technical proposal. This has lead to the adoption of somewhat problematic scoring rules
like the one described in the text (see Wolfstetter, 2006).
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is generally not applicable to the technical proposal because that bid is typically a complex
document rather than a single number. Therefore, the technical proposal has to be an
electronically secure sealed-bid auction (Practical Conclusion 3), as explained above.
For the financial proposal one has more options. One can either also use the same elec-
tronic bid submission system with a secure logbook or use an open auction format. An
open decreasing-price bid auction should take place after the technical proposals are
evaluated and the quality scores are published. The best way to run it is a clock auction
in wich, however, the usual price clock is replaced by a score clock. Given his quality
score, each bidder can then compute the price that corresponds to a given score.
Practical Conclusion 4. Make the technical proposals tamper-proof by using an elec-
tronic bid submission system with a secure logbook. Make the financial proposals either
in the same form or use an open score clock format, where price bidding takes place
after all technical proposals have been evaluated.14
Even after bids have been made tamper-proof, corruption may still be an issue in the eval-
uation of technical proposals. Bidders may attempt to bribe members of the evaluation
committee in exchange for biased quality scores. Having bribed one or more evaluators
allows the bidder to ask for a higher price.
We believe that there is no perfect remedy for this problem. Yet, there are ways to make
this type of corruption more difficult, more costly, or more risky for the involved parties.
One way is to reduce the weight of quality to account for the fact that the quality signal is
less reliable due to the possibility of manipulation.15 Another way is to draw evaluators
at random from a large pool after bids have been submitted. This decreases the influence
of a single member of the pool of evaluators and thus makes it more costly for bidders
to “buy” a good quality assessment.
Practical Conclusion 5. If possible, draw evaluators at random from a large pool of
potential evaluators after bids have been submitted. Of course, one should always
make sure that evaluators are not in conflict with past or present obligations with any
bidder.
One should also analyze the distribution of quality scores in order to detect bias in the
assessment of individual evaluators. If evaluators agree on a quality ranking it is unlikely
that an evaluator has been bribed.16 If an evaluator has been bribed he will submit an
14For example, the World Bank permits electronic bid submission but insists that “… the system is se-
cure, maintains the confidentiality and authenticity of proposals submitted, uses an electronic signature
system … and only allows proposals to be opened with due simultaneous electronic authorization of the
consultant and the Borrower” (The World Bank, 2004b, p. 21).
15This has been suggested by Burguet and Che (2004).
16It could of course mean that all evaluators have been bribed by the same bidder, but this would be
hard to detect unless one can observe the transfer of bribes.
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assessment that is biased in favor of his client. In principle, such a bias could be detected
with statistical test. However, in practice, the power of such a test will be weak because
the number of evaluators is typically small.
There is a simple way in which the effect of such outliers can be reduced. It is usual
to compute the quality score as the simple average of the assessments of the individual
evaluators. Simple means that each evaluator’s score is given the same weight. Yet, we
would like to give less or even no weight to outliers.
One can do this by using a trimmed mean instead. The x%-trimmed mean is the mean
calculated after removing the top x% of the observations from the top and bottom of data
sets.17 For instance, a simple implementation of this idea would be to remove, for each
proposal, the highest and the lowest quality score over all evaluators, and then compute
the mean of the remaining evaluators.
Going one step further, one can compute themedian of the quality scores of all evaluators.
The median is the quality score of the evaluator who is “in the middle”: one half of the
evaluators rate the proposal higher, the other half rate it lower than the median evaluator.
Unlike the mean, the median is not affected by outliers. An extreme evaluation by a single,
biased evaluator (possible because he has been bribed) has no effect on the median score.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of this alternative aggregation method. There are three
proposals and seven evaluators. The evaluators cannot measure the objective quality of
the proposals precisely, so their quality scores are not perfectly precise. We simulate
this by adding some noise when simulating the evaluators’ quality scores.18 As we can
see from the true quality scores, proposal A has the highest quality. It is also the most
expensive, but according to the scoring rule, it is this proposal that should be chosen.
Proposal B is of somewhat lower quality but is also cheaper. According to the scoring
rule, it comes in second. In the example, evaluator 1 has been bribed by the suppliers
of proposal B: he inflates his quality score for proposal B, and biases his quality score
against the strongest competitor, proposal A, in an attempt to turn the decision in favor
of B.
The average quality scores of the three proposals, using simple averages over all seven
evaluators, are 56.1 for A, 58.1 for B, and 48.4 for C, respectively. The total scores are
56.9, 60.0, and 58.7, respectively, so that proposal B is chosen. Evaluator 1’s bias has
tipped the balance away from the better choice A. If, however, the aggregate quality score
would have been evaluated using the median instead of the mean, evaluator 1 would not
have been able to make a difference, as can be seen from the table. In this case, the
aggregate quality scores are 58.0, 53.0, and 45.0, respectively, and proposal A wins with
a total score of 58.4 against 55.9 for proposal B.
We have estimated the robustness of this finding with a Monte-Carlo simulation.19 We
17Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) have used this idea to compute inflation rates that are less affected by
extreme price fluctuations of single commodities.
18Specifically, we add normally distributed noise to the evaluators’ quality scores, plus some bias in
evaluators’ scoring, while truncating scores to [0,100].
19We ran 10,000 draws using R. B. Myerson’s SimTools utility, see http://home.uchicago.edu/
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Table 1: Mean vs. Median Aggregation in Scoring Auctions
proposal A B C
price 45 40 27
price score 60.0 67.5 100.0
true quality score 60 55 45
true total score 60.0 57.5 56.0
quality score evaluator 1 46 75 44
2 53 53 45
3 65 48 58
4 59 64 63
5 58 49 50
6 60 67 42
7 52 51 37
result using mean aggregation
quality score 56.1 58.1 48.4
total score 56.9 60.0 58.7
result using median aggregation
quality score 58.0 53.0 45.0
total score 58.4 55.9 56.0
find that, with the particular parameters we have chosen, the aggregation of the quality
scores using simple means correctly selects proposal A only with 23% probability. This
probability increases to 47% if the median is used instead.20 However, the flip side is that
median aggregation also chooses the least attractive proposal C with higher probability,
which is of course undesirable.21
Practical Conclusion 6. In scoring auctions, consider using the median of the evalua-
tors’ quality scores instead of the usual mean.
Even if a statistical test is not available, inspection of the scores in Table 1 makes evalu-
ator 1 appear suspicious. In such circumstances, one obvious course of action is to start
an investigation. Independently, one should ask for a second opinion from a separate
team of evaluators. An investigation could involve questioning the evaluators and pos-
sibly checking their recent bank transactions. Once an evaluator has aroused suspicion
~rmyerson/addins.htm. The worksheet that contains the specification of evaluators’ bias and the as-
sumed random errors is available for download from our websites.
20One caveat is in order here: we do not model the strategic aspects of the evaluators’ assessments.
A corrupt evaluator may behave differently depending in whether the mean or the median is used for
computing the quality score. What remains true, nonetheless, is that the median is much less affected
by extreme points of view. Because corrupt evaluators are more likely to make extreme (i.e. biased)
assessments, using the median reduces the power of corrupt evaluators, and thus decreases the bidders’
willingness to pay for corruption.
21Mean aggregation selects project C with 4% and median aggregation with 10% probability.
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he should be blacklisted. Moreover, second-opinions should be routinely solicited at ran-
dom even if there is no indication of a bias. Of course, this policy should be advertised
to all involved parties as a deterrent.
Practical Conclusion 7. Inspect the individual quality scores and check for indications
of an outlier. If manipulation is suspected, consider soliciting a second opinion or
initiating a criminal investigation. It is also advisable to make this policy known to all
involved parties before the auction takes place, as a deterring device.
Apparently some agencies do not record the scores of individual evaluators and their
evaluation committees report only their average score. Evidently, this hides important
information, which is not advisable.
4 the special case of objective quality measures
In some rare cases, the relevant quality is readily measurable without complex evaluation.
In these cases one can execute a scoring auction essentially in the same manner as a
standard one dimensional auction, where bidding in scores takes the place of price, and
all the issues and advice we gave in Sect. 2 apply with some slight reinterpretation.
A case in point is the so called “A+B Bidding” procedure employed by Federal and State
Highway Administrations in the U.S. in their selection of contractors for highway repair
work.22 There, a major quality concern is the duration of construction work, which causes
costly traffic delays.
“A+B Bidding” requires bidders to submit a financial proposal (estimated cost) and a time
completion estimate, and uses the following linear scoring rule
total cost score = estimated cost+ time completion estimate× time unit cost,
based on a stipulated completion time unit, and then awards the contract to the proposal
with the lowest totals cost score.23
In such an auction bidding can be viewed (and could actually be implemented) as a one
dimensional auction, where each bidder submits a score, the lowest score bid wins, with
the understanding that the winner is free to select his preferred combination of cost
and time for completion as long as it delivers the promised total score. Of course, the
bidding of scores can be either sealed-bid or an open-bid format. Manipulation of the
quality assessment is not an issue, and therefore corruption can only take the form of
bid rigging which we have discussed in Section 2.
22The U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) initiated this format already in 1990, and it is now
widely and successfully used (see for example the performance evaluation by the State of Arizona (1999)).
23Of course, the rules also stipulate an incentive/disincentive for early/late completion of the con-
struction job.
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5 further issues
In QCBS based procurement one usually requires a short-list of a given size, typically six
bidders, regardless of how many bidders have submitted their Expression of Interest.24
This rigid requirement is made with the intention to assure transparency, fairness, and
competition. However, it is often counterproductive because it brings low quality bidders
into the bidding.
A low quality bidder is a bidder who has a low level of technical expertise and is unable to
deliver a high quality product or service. If high quality bidders participate in the bidding,
a low quality bidder has little or no chance of winning without corruption. Therefore, he is
particularly inclined to bribe evaluators in exchange for a favorable quality assessment or
for insider information concerning unspecified yet desired product characteristics. This
is how low quality bidders may turn into “rotten apples,” and thus rigid short-listing
requirements may contribute to corrupt the procurement process.
A potential remedy for this problem is to keep the size of the short-list somewhat flexible,
and allow a shorter short-list in the event when not enough high quality bidders have
submitted their Expression of Interest.
Practical Conclusion 8. In QCBS procurement keep the size of the required short-list
of bidders who are invited to submit their technical and financial proposals flexible.
In that short-list you should not include bidders who are known or suspected of low
quality, because they are most likely to corrupt the procurement process.
Permitting some flexibility in choosing the size of the evaluation committee runs counter
the philosophy that is currently prevalent at the EC and various international agencies.
They firmly believe in rigid prescriptions of competition as the best safeguard against
corruption. However, practical experience suggests that these very rules often open the
door to bidders who are particularly prone to corruption.
Of course, the following precaution should be taken.
Practical Conclusion 9. The short-list should not be prepared by those who serve later
as evaluators of technical proposals. Otherwise, evaluators may be tempted to include
“rotten apples” with the expectation that these will most likely offer bribes to them.
Efforts to curb corruption have been increased in recent years, due to new legislation that
makes companies liable for bribes paid by their branches and affiliates and also for bribes
paid to third parties. Another important milestone is the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) that was passed by the Congress in 1977 and later ratified by several other
countries. That act prescribes the prosecution of companies involved in corrupt practices
in and outside their home country.25 In the past many countries permitted their national
24See for example the short-listing requirements of the European Community, The World Bank, and
the Asian Development Bank.
25See http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/c6698.htm.
11
firms to tax deduct bribes paid abroad as business expenses. In view of this practice the
proliferation of legislation like the FCPA is an important change of direction.
Finally, we mention that corruption often extends to the time after the contract has been
awarded, during the execution of the job. There, corruption takes the form of granting
the contractor generous change orders that inflate the price above the level stated in the
original financial proposal. The door for this kind of corruption is generally wide open
if the Terms of Reference that state the technical specifications and cost estimate are
imprecise. Therefore, one should always insist on a carefully worked out and detailed
Terms of Reference.
Practical Conclusion 10. Make sure that the Terms of Reference for the technical pro-
posal are well researched and worked out in detail. Consider setting up a review process
for all change orders that may be requested by the contractor during the contract ex-
ecution. Without these precautions the door is open for excessive change orders and
subsequent cost overruns.
Of course, the need for change orders can never be ruled out altogether. Depending
upon the nature of the procured good or service, it is more or less common that the
contractor’s tasks must be adjusted to unforeseen events.26 Therefore, the relationship
between contractor and procurer needs constant governance.
6 bibliographic notes
The theoretical literature views corruption in auctions as a manipulation of the quality
assessment in complex bids or as bid rigging. And it distinguishes between corruption
based on a predetermined relationship between the procurer and a favored bidder and
on an endogenous selection of the favored bidder.
The first theoretical contribution is probably by Laffont and Tirole (1991). They assume
that the auctioneer has some leeway in assessing complex multidimensional bids, and is
predisposed to favor a given bidder. That framework was later adopted and extended by
several authors (for example Celantani and Ganuza (2002) and Burguet and Che (2004)).
A second branch of the literature considers a particular form of bid rigging, in which the
auctioneer grants a “right of first refusal” to a favored bidder. This right gives the favored
bidder the option to match the highest bid and win the auction (see, for example Burguet
and Perry (2003), Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004), and Koc and Neilson (2005)).
This scheme implies that all bidders know about the corruption, and thus entails a large
risk of detection. An auctioneer who cares about the risk of detection should consider
proposing corruption only to a small set of bidders.
26Change orders are particularly frequent in construction and in engineering and architectural ser-
vices. For an interesting case study of private sector building contracts in Northern California see Bajari,
McMillan, and Tadelis (2002).
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This takes us to the third branch of the literature which assumes that bid rigging is
arranged by the auctioneer after he has observed all the bids. This allows him to ap-
proach only a minimum number of bidders, and select the bidder(s) whose collaboration
delivers the highest profit (see Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2005, Menezes and Monteiro,
2003). Another paper on bid rigging by Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier (2005)
assumes that bribes cannot exceed a small upper bound. This is meaningful in some con-
texts; however, bribes are often accepted only if they are sufficiently high to compensate
for the risk of detection and punishment.
The practical problems of fighting corruption in procurement are documented in many
publications by international agencies such as The World Bank, The Asian Development
Bank, the WTO, and the European Community (see for example Aguilar, Gill, and Pino
(2000) and Trepte (2004, Ch.6)). Awareness of corruption and efforts to curb it — ranging
from hot-lines and rewards for “whizzle blowers,” to blacklisting of contractors who were
caught in corruption, and staff rotation — have increased both in the private and in the
public sector. An interesting collection of case studies drawn from private and public
sector experience, including an account of the remarkable case of the reform of the public
sector in Singapore by Lee (1999), is in Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999) and Arvis and
Berenbeim (2003).
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